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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of Husband's cross-appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
BY CROSS-APPEAL 
Two issues are presented for review by Husband's cross-appeal: 
1. Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Awarding to 
Wife a Disproportionate Two-thirds Share of the Marital 
Property? 
The standard of appellate review of an award of marital property in divorce is 
"clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Bradford v. DeMita, 1999 UT App 373, ] 12, 384 Utah 
Adv. 26. This issue was preserved in the District Court by Respondent's Objections 
to Supplemental Findings of Fact, Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Motion to 
Amend and Request for Oral Argument filed January 29, 1999. R. 247, 249-250. 
2. Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Awarding 
Alimony to Wife, in Light of the Court's Finding the She Is 
Able to Meet Her Reasonable Financial Needs from Income 
Generated by the Income-producing Marital Assets Awarded 
to Her? 
The standard of appellate review of a trial court's determination of alimony is 
also "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211. 
Bradford, 1999 UT App, ^[12. This issue was also preserved in the District Court by 
Respondent's Objections to Supplemental Findings of Fact, Supplemental Decree of 
1 
Divorce, Motion to Amend and Request for Oral Argument filed January 29, 1999. 
R. 247-249. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY 
OR REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1996), as discussed in various 
cases decided by this Court and by the Utah Supreme Court, is determinative of the 
first issue raised by this cross-appeal. There are no other constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of any 
issue in this cross-appeal or is of central importance to this cross-appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPO-
SITION BELOW 
The statement of these matters in the Brief of Appellant appears to be complete 
and correct. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Brief of Appellant fails, either in its Statement of Facts or in subsequent 
argument, to identify and marshal many of the facts supporting the findings and 
conclusions of the District Court on the issues on which she appeals. Husband 
therefore supplements the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellant for the 
purpose of rectifying its omissions and of providing the factual predicate for 
Husband's own cross-appeal. 
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1 Facts Relating to Award of Separate Property to Husband 
I he I Hi iin, i i nun i \jHinl il I HI iMiiiiH il i 1 in mi . o p i a t e propert)' , 1 lis 
partnership .-'terests in the three principal eomnonents of the Jensen, family ranching 
business , ampany, .,,:•.:iesandtneMoynierRanch)together willJ y^,}bl 
shares of Zio*> Rank stock ! In land u^tnih received essentially all oi tills separate 
property b\ gn^-i i; nH;ii taiu.e from his parents. Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
1 l*niiusioii - Lti : ' • s •  > 
f \ Ranches, Moyniei kancn r e miscellaneous associated grazing permits, 
* t 
( oart found "MI MOMC ot f ^ -: have ever been titled in thenamev nt spouse^ nt t-v 
he spouses j^viuiiin, \ \ i k cwi u \ i 
requested to pledge independent credit or support lor the lanchur^ < operations,. iu. <\i 
T-N Company Partnershir 1 -N Company, the opt • i: .m/ 
family ranching business, was i.mned ~? the time of triai n this matter r . Husband 
and his two brothers. 1 K 
brothers'' respective shares were equal imrus r- VK I m some other proportion ? 'u 
Court: made no .tlteitipf in in Mtlw ilnis issue 
to separate property awardee u Husband. Sup; :gs oi Fact and 
'A'hile • t»th i-i his brothers \*ntked full-time in the nnchmg operations as 
^ompan>, ,K,>;>and was engageo iu?i -. -ie u-me practice 
J 
of law and worked on the ranch primarily on weekends, for which he received no 
compensation. R. 323:35, 324:199-202. The statement in the Brief of Appellant at 
p. 10 that "[Husband] spent as much time on the ranching operations as [his brothers] 
did throughout the parties' marriage" is false and unsupported by the references to the 
Record cited in the brief. See Brief of Appellant, p. 10, and citations in the brief to 
R. 323:126,148, R. 324:199-202. The relevant evidence on this point, unrebutted but 
not cited in the Brief of Appellant, is Husband's testimony that he averaged "at least 
eleven, twelve hours a day" in the practice of law, and that "if I wasn't tied up in my 
law practice, I typically tried to spend one day a week in the farming-ranching side." 
R. 324:193-94. 
The District Court found that Wife "went very infrequently to the [ranch] 
properties and there was no evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the 
properties." Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f^ 14, R. 227. 
It is untrue, and unsupported by Wife's references to the Record, that she "often" 
accompanied Husband to the ranch properties or performed "maintenance duties" 
while there. See Brief of Appellant, p. 9, and citations in the brief to R. 81, and 
R. 323:119-120. Her actual testimony on the subject was that during the first year of 
the marriage, 1970, she was on the ranch "quite a few weekends" or "whenever 1 
could be" but that after their first child was bom, the summer following the marriage, 
she was "stuck at home." R. 323:36, 119. In response to a question as to how much 
time she had spent on the ranch over the entire 27-year course of the marriage, she 
replied, "I have no idea." When given the opportunity to respond affirmatively to the 
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question, "[s]o you actually went 01 it and worked o^ 'he ranch on a regular basis?." 
she answered only "[ejertain occasions we went "* •'  ^23:120. 
it was Husband's lestimr-'- [ r ^ ( * .ilMi i iin I he 
s u m m e r o f 1 ° a l , while pregnani \\un na Tir^ n A ,lia: dunnn ihe entire course of 
i : • : < . d 
that ifiose v 'Hi> were m^ working visits but social wMti .MIL ILJUU^ ^ t.,Vfc>-
198. 
The ranch was a source of friction between I lusband and Wife. She testified 
• • ..v a.iciiing operations: and he testified nr^]he never 
supported me in 'n,- t mrhinn nn^rai i01ib> t . . She diun * i 
i winpan\ as a marital asset relies in part on a possible loan transaction between 1 -N 
Compam Jiiiil1 IS l.ilpiisn ('nipni.iln ill 
The Record facts relating to that transaction are as follows: \* sonn- noint, T-N 
( o»n pan)' e\n, iiiccll ,i | >i i »i 111 * .* • ; » v * - :-a\ahic .*> \ a i pa so 
Corporation, .n entit\ forned u- • *' ?" "> Mishap*' • d one of his brothers, ir v ' *" 
v
' ' L\tiiDitsD-Lv li-3,y i he Record is Mient 
a> to the nature of the transaction ^ •* *M ** d^c ^K1,nation wdb <> - w 
;r ' v>, ce of the funds, ii dh* -x-^i . \a ; uansferred b\ Ylaip.tso *• i ^ 
Lompar luuuu, it is unclear wu.-,!'- • ' ' : 
or other value by Malpaso to T-N ('ompany In response to questioning by the Court 
as to this note and others executed by T-N company, Wife's expert, Dean Smith, 
testified as follows: 
The Court: Well, that means these [payees of the notes] loaned their 
money to T-N Company, and T-N . . . then owed the money back to them? 
The Witness: That's true, but I don't think there was ever a cash 
transaction. . . . 
The Court: So these were notes carried on the books, for whatever 
reason, and then were simply washed and forgotten? 
The Witness: Correct. 
R. 324:91-92. If actual funds or value were transferred, the Record contains no 
evidence linking them to marital property. In any event, the $85,033 note was 
ultimately cancelled. R. 324:51-52. 
T-N Company Notes Given by T.N. Jensen to Wife. Another set of transactions 
which Wife relies on to support her claim that marital property was used in the 
ranching business relates to the assignment to her and subsequent cancellation of 
certain notes of T-N Company originally payable to Husband's father, T.N. Jensen. 
In connection with a tax-plan for distribution of his estate prior to his death, T.N. 
Jensen assigned to Wife his interest in three promissory notes payable to him by T-N 
Company in the amount of $10,000 each. R. 325:87-88; cf. R. 324:219-220.1 
Following T.N. Jensen's death in 1992, these notes were cancelled. The related book 
entries credited the value of the cancelled notes to the equity accounts of the T-N 
•Documentary evidence of only one of these three gifts was offered at trial. See 
Exhibit P-6. 
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Company partners equally. R. 324:51-52. Wife's testimony on direct examination 
by her counsel was vague as to the number and amount of these notes. She displayed 
no knowledge of the transaction by which the notes were canceled and credited to the 
partners' equity, nor any knowledge of the purposeful context of that transaction. 
R. 323:84. 
A variety of other obligations of T-N Company were dealt with similarly upon 
the death of T.N. Jensen. R. 324:51 -52,90-92. There is no evidence that he assigned 
the T-N Company notes to Wife for any purpose other than that of facilitating the 
maximum tax-free disposition, year by year, of his estate. The District Court appears 
not to have considered and to have made no finding, nor is there record evidence to 
suggest, that the assignment of the notes and their subsequent cancellation was ever 
intended by T.N. Jensen or his heirs, or understood by Wife, to vest in her any 
interest in T-N Company. 
Proceeds of Sale ofZions Bank Stock Transferred to T-N Company. Wife also 
relies in argument on a transaction by which $65,000 in proceeds of the sale of 861 
Zions Bank shares nominally held in joint tenancy by Husband and Wife was 
transferred to T-N Company. Her Statement of Facts fails to note, however, that 
these shares were not derived in whole or in part from the 750 shares, acquired in 
January 1988 during the course of the marriage, which were conceded by Husband 
and found by the District Court to be marital property and divided equally. The 861 
shares sold to provide funds for T-N Company, in contrast, had the same pre-marital 
source as those which the Court awarded to Husband as his separate property. 
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R. 325:47-49, Exhibits D-20, D-21, Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. ^ 1 7 , 19, R. 231. 
T-N Ranches Partnership. T-N Ranches was owned equally by Husband, his 
two brothers and his sister. R. 325:75. No interest in the T-N Ranches property was 
ever held by any of the siblings' spouses, including Wife. R. 325:76. The properties 
which made up T-N Ranches were acquired in 1962 by Husband's parents, T.N. 
Jensen and Bonnie Jensen, and subsequently transferred directly to the Jensen 
siblings or entities in which they held an interest. Exhibit D-39. 
The interests of the siblings in T-N Ranches were initially disproportionate, 
with Husband holding the largest share. In 1988 Wife joined Husband in executing 
declarations of gift transferring portions of his interest in T-N Company to his 
siblings. Exhibit P-12; R. 324:49-50. Husband testified that "[Wife] joined with me 
in making a gift of my interest, trying to equalize my two brothers and my sister at 
the request of my father." R. 325:85 (emphasis added). Following the death of T.N. 
Jensen, his remaining interest was divided equally, which left the four siblings each 
with a 25% interest in the T-N Ranches partnership. 
Moynier Ranch Properties. The Moynier Ranch properties are held directly in 
the names of Husband and his brothers. Exhibits D-27, D-28. The Moynier properties 
were purchased from the Moynier family for $827,675, of which $633,437 
represented credits for lands acquired by the three brothers from Husband's parents 
and transferred to the Moynier family or sold and the proceeds used for the purchase. 
The balance either had been paid by the brothers or was outstanding at the date of 
8 
trial. R. 323:142-144, 181-183, R. 325:56-61; Exhibits D-27, D-28, D-29, D-34. 
Husband testified that none of the consideration provided in the acquisition of the 
Moynier Ranch properties was derived from marital property. R. 325:59. 
The Brief of Appellant asserts, without qualification, n[t]he $25,000 down 
payment [for the Moynier properties] came from the parties' marital funds." See Brief 
of Appellant, p. 12, citing R. 82, 224. But this contention is without support, either 
in the cited pages or elsewhere in the Record. 
Of the total purchase price of $827,675 for the Moynier Ranch properties, the 
ultimate source of only $ 148,500 is unaccounted for in the Record. Husband testified 
that the latter amount was paid by the Jensen brothers. R. 323:182; Exhibit D-29. 
There is no documentary evidence or testimony linking Husband's share of the 
$148,500 to marital funds in the amount of $25,000 or any other amount. 
The only evidence as to the source of the Jensen siblings' payments on 
Moynier, including those made by Husband, is that they were made, at least in part, 
from "special" checking accounts set up for the siblings by their father and funded 
from mineral royalties or the proceeds of sale of property originating with Husband's 
parents. R. 323:75 and 183, R. 324:206-207. Each of the siblings had such an 
account, in which their spouses had no interest. R. 324:208-210. 
Ranching Operations Generally. Respecting the ranching business as a whole, 
the testimony was undisputed that none of the siblings' spouses, including Wife, ever 
held an interest of record, ever participated in the making of business decisions, ever 
signed any document on behalf of the business, ever lent their credit to the business, 
9 
or ever otherwise participated in its operation. See, e.g., R. 324:207-212, R. 325:66, 
68,70,73,76. 
Zions Bank Shares. In addition to the ranching properties, Husband held shares 
of Carbon-Emery Bank prior to the marriage which, subsequent to the merger of that 
bank with Zions Bank in 1973, were converted into 2,126 shares of stock in Zions 
Bank. R. 325:43, 48. At the time of trial these shares had, by virtue of stock splits 
and dividend re-investments, less sales, grown to 58,352 shares. R. 325:44-45. 
At Wife's request in 1985, Husband, who at that point held these Zions Bank 
shares in his name only, caused all of the shares to be placed in the names of both 
Husband and Wife in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. The assertion at page 
5 of the Brief of Appellant that Husband "conceded at trial that the stock certificates 
gave Wife a present interest in the stock" is false. Husband's testimony on the 
Record page cited in support of this claim is precisely to the contrary: 
Q. At the time that these changes were made, Mr. Jensen, did you 
intend to give Mrs. Jensen a present interest in the Zions Bank Stock? 
A. No. 
R. 324:216. 
The testimony of both Husband and Wife as to why he placed the Zions Bank 
shares in joint tenancy is consistent that he did so to satisfy Wife's desire that in the 
event of his early death she have immediate access to the shares. Wife's testimony 
on direct examination by her own counsel as to why she asked Husband to place the 
stock in joint tenancy was, "I just feel like isn't that what this marriage is all about. 
10 
We're both working in the same direction for the same ends." R. 323:64. But under 
cross-examination by counsel for Husband the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Do you recall in that conversation your telling him why you wanted 
him to do that? 
A. Well, because I felt like we are working for everything together. At 
that particular time 1 felt like it was very important, because he was gone a lot. 
And I said to Jim, "If something ever happened to you, you know I - I 
wouldn't want to have to deal with it." And he felt that -1 mean, he reassured 
me and said, "It's something that I should have been done anyway." 
Q. Do you recall specifically saying to him, "I'm very concerned, with 
all of your travel, that if something happens to you -" 
A. Yes. I was concerned with everything because at one point we 
didn't even have a will. 
R. 323:128. Husband recalled perhaps five occasions over several months on which 
Wife asked him to put the Zions Bank shares in joint tenancy. R. 324:213-214. He 
testified regarding these conversations as follows: 
Q. Tell the Court, if you would, please, in substance what was said by 
her and what was said by you in the course of these discussions? 
A. She indicated to me that the stock was all in my name, and she was 
concerned if something happened to me, and that I was traveling, and away 
from home a lot, what would happen. To my stock. 
Q. What [did] you respond? 
11 
A. I told her that she that she knew that we had joint wills, that if 
something happened to me provisions were made to take care of her and the 
girls through the probate of my will. 
Q. Okay. Did the discussion continue or the discussions continue to the 
point that changes in fact were made on the names on the respective stock 
certificates? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Will you tell us, please, why those changes were made? 
A. Well, 1 just got tired of the discussion with her, and put her name on 
the shares of stock. 
R. 324:214-216. The District Court, on this issue, found as follows: 
This change [to joint tenancy] was made according to the testimony of the 
parties at a time when the Defendant was engaged in significant business 
travel, and the change was made to avoid probate in the event of his untimely 
death. There was no evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent with 
respect to such exchange. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 18, R. 236. 
2. Facts Relating to Division of Marital Property 
Marital Property. The Memorandum Decision of the District Court includes 
a finding in the form of a schedule of distribution of marital property, consisting 
principally of the family residence, automobiles and investments and retirement 
accounts acquired during the course of the marriage. The Court valued the marital 
estate at a total sum of $3,006,536.64, awarding to Wife an approximate two-thirds 
12 
share valued at $2,004,736.16 and to Husband the one-third remainder, valued at 
$1,001,800.48. R. 213-214. 
The sole basis for awarding this disproportionate two-thirds of the marital 
property to Wife, consisted of the District Court's finding that "certain assets should 
not be divided equally between the parties even though they were acquired during the 
course of the marriage and have been determined by the Court to constitute in part, 
the martial [sic] estate." The Court's declared purpose in so doing was to "recognize 
that . . . the Defendant has had the benefit of premarital assets that are now of 
significant value." Supplemental Findings of Fact ^ 36, R. 236; see also, Id., ffij 14, 
16; R. 227-229 (Monica Cove residence distributed to wife free of associated 
mortgage obligation to compensate wife for Husband's absence on ranch business). 
The Record contains no other finding in support of the disproportionate distribution 
of marital property. 
3. Facts Relating to Award of Alimony to Wife 
Included by the District Court in the two-thirds share of the marital property 
awarded to Wife were income-producing assets capable of generating annual income 
of $85,110.84 or $7,092.57 per month. The Court also noted that should she sell the 
Monica Cove residence and move to a home of value comparable to that occupied by 
Husband, the resulting difference of $200,000 "could earn an additional $15,000 per 
year or $ 1,250 per month.,f Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
H 36, R. 326-327. 
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Although the District Court noted that, at a total of more than $100,000 per 
year or $8,300 per month, "the income potentially generated from the assets awarded 
to [Wife] would be sufficient to meet her needs," the Court nevertheless ordered 
Husband to pay alimony to Wife in the amount of $4,000 per month until Husband 
reaches age 65, stating as its reason for so doing that "[Wife] should not be required 
to live off of the yield from her assets when the [Husband] would not be required to 
do so by reason of his separate earned income." Id. at ^ 37, R. 237. 
The Court further found that Husband had annual gross income of $195,000 
but made no finding as to his net income, nor did it make any finding as to Husband's 
own needs. See id. 
Expenses of Wife. At trial, Wife presented a schedule of anticipated expenses 
totaling $8,572 per month, including $2,232 of residential mortgage expense and 
$520 of high school tuition expense for daughter Jorja, an eighteen year-old who was 
in her senior year at the time of trial. R. 323:59-60, Exhibit P-2. In the course of 
cross-examination of Wife, counsel for Husband established that the tuition and other 
school expense had been paid by Husband for the balance of the year (R. 323:107 and 
114), and that other of the listed expenses were inflated. See generally, R. 323:108-
116. Following trial, but before entry of the Court's findings, Wife presented to the 
Court an estimate of her "future need" of $7,652 per month. See Plaintiffs Post-Trial 
Brief, p. 17, R. 124. 
During the pendency of the divorce proceeding Husband paid to Wife agreed 
temporary alimony in the amount of $6,000 per month, which included funds 
14 
sufficient to make the monthly mortgage payments of $2,207 on the Monica Cove 
residence, to make a $700 per month payment on the Spring Glen home and to 
provide for the needs of daughter Jorja, leaving a net amount used for living expenses 
of $2,947 per month.2 R. 323:29-30, 100-101. Although she testified that she had 
borrowed unspecified amounts from her brother, Wife conceded, in effect, that the 
temporary alimony had been sufficient for her needs. Her testimony was: 
Q. . . . Of the $6,000 you received and then we deducted 
these [mortgage] payments, the balance of about $2,900 or $3,000 
a month was what you used to support yourself and Jorja? 
A. Yes. That was gone in the rest of the utilities bills and 
gas bills. 
Q. Okay. But you didn't have any funds for the support of 
Jorja other than those amounts for the last 18 months, have you? 
A. No. 
R. 323:101-102. 
The Record contains no other evidence bearing on Wife's need following the 
divorce, and the Court made no finding as to wife's need. 
Wife's Earning Capacity. Although wife did not work outside the home while 
the children were small, from 1985-1990 she was employed in Husband's law office 
2The Spring Glen home was sold prior to the divorce, and the District Court 
awarded the Monica Cove residence to Wife but required Husband to assume the 
mortgage obligations. See Supplemental Findings of Fact ^ 37, R. 235-236. 
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in a clerical capacity, performing word processing, filing and receptionist duties. 
Husband testified that she was a 'Very good" employee. R. 324:195-197. Wife 
testified that she is qualified for part- or full-time employment as a receptionist. 
R. 323:55. No evidence was offered as to Wife's likely earnings were she to find 
employment, and the District Court made no finding in that regard. 
Income and Expenses of Husband. There was some disagreement as to 
Husband's disposable annual income. His own calculation, based on actual 1997 data, 
was $11,893 per month [or 12 x $11,893 = $142,716 annually]. R. 324:229-237, 
R. 325:91; Exhibit D-7. Wife's expert, Dean Smith, calculated that Husband's "cash 
flow," based on 1995 income and expense as shown in the parties' tax return, was 
$181,525 for that year [or $181,525 + 12 = $15,127 per month]. R. 324:53-56; 
Exhibit P-5. Husband's expenses, net of alimony and child support, were shown at 
trial to be $10,852. R. 324:239-249, R. 325:91-92; Exhibit D-9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First Issue on Cross-Appeal. Utah standards for the exercise of equitable 
discretion in divorce presume that marital property will be divided equally and 
require the trial court to justify a departure from that presumption by a finding of 
exceptional circumstances and needs. The District Court made no such finding in this 
case. It is clearly possible that the Court was moved by a desire to compensate Wife 
for the award to Husband of his substantial interest in the Jensen family ranching 
business as his separate property. If so, that circumstance was improperly considered, 
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since the distribution to a party of his separate property is required under Utah case 
law to be determined independent of and prior to the division of marital property. It 
is also possible that the Court wished to compensate Wife for Husband's failure to 
spend two full weekend days with his family, rather than spending one or both of 
them working on the ranch. But that fact, had the Court entered a finding identifying 
it as the relevant consideration (which it did not), fails to meet the standards 
established by Utah case law for the required "exceptional circumstances". 
Second Issue on Cross-Appeal Under Utah law, alimony is in its essence 
remedial, awarded for the purpose of closing the gap between need and earning 
capacity. It is thus error to award alimony to one capable of meeting individual needs 
from individual income. The District Court's award of alimony to Wife in the amount 
of $4,000 per month cannot therefore be sustained in light of the clear and undisputed 
evidence that marital property awarded to her included property capable of providing 
her with an income of $100,000 per year against her maximum claimed need of only 
$92,000 per year. Moreover, the Court failed to make the required findings as to the 
respective needs of both Wife and Husband and as to his ability to pay. Under these 
circumstances, the Court's alimony award represents a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion and must be reversed. 
Reply to Appellant's First Issue. Wife asserts a claim to an equal share of 
58,532 shares of Zions Bank stock which the Court awarded to Husband as his 
separate property, finding them to be a gift from his parents antedating the marriage. 
Wife contends that by placing the shares in joint tenancy at her request, husband 
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effectively transferred to her a present interest in the shares, and that they thereby 
became marital property. Neither the evidence nor the law supports her claim. Both 
Husband and Wife testified that she asked for the shares to be placed in joint tenancy 
at a time when Husband was engaged in frequent travel, so as to give her orderly and 
immediate access to the shares in the event of his untimely death. The Record 
provides no evidence of any other coherent purpose on the part of either spouse. The 
case law cited by Wife is either inapposite on the facts, dealing with challenges to 
joint tenancy brought by strangers to its creation, has been rejected by the Utah 
courts, or stands for the contrary of the position she argues. Moreover, the Brief of 
Appellant fails to marshal the facts in support of the challenged finding of the District 
Court awarding the shares to Husband. 
Reply to Appellant's Second Issue. Finally, Wife's claim to an inteR t in the 
Jensen family ranching business rests on the argument that occasional social visits to 
the ranch during which she prepared meals for friends, together with various paper 
transactions supposed by her to involve commingling of marital assets with the 
ranching business, transactions of which neither she nor her counsel appears to have 
understood the underlying economic reality, somehow converted her Husband's 
interest in the ranching business into marital property. There is no evidence that any 
of these transactions involved marital property. The Malpaso loan transaction upon 
which she relies certainly did not involve marital funds, as she claims, and probably 
did not involve a transfer of funds of any kind, according to the testimony of her own 
expert. Similarly, three $10,000 promissory notes gifted to her by Husband's father 
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and subsequently canceled were clearly her separate property. Therefore, even if the 
notes represented a transfer of actual funds, again, her expert thought not, they were 
obviously not marital funds. Another transaction upon which she relies, the sale by 
Husband of Zions Bank shares and the contribution of the $65,000 proceeds to the 
ranching business, clearly involved a contribution of his separate property, not a 
commingling of marital property as she claims. Nor is there any evidence that 
Husband used marital funds to acquire any part of the Moynier ranch properties. 
Moreover, Wife again fails to marshal the evidence in support of the challenged 
finding that the ranch properties were the separate property of husband. And, in any 
case, the evidence she cites for her claim falls far short of that "clear and convincing" 
quantum necessary to justify this Court in setting aside the finding of the District 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
In disregard of the settled practice of Utah trial courts and the rules laid down 
by Utah appellate courts for the orderly exercise of equitable discretion in divorce 
proceedings, the District Court, in the absence of supporting findings, awarded Wife 
a disproportionate two-thirds share of the marital estate. Also without necessary 
supporting findings as to the parties' respective needs or Husband's ability to pay, the 
Court awarded Wife alimony of $4,000 per month, contrary to its own determination 
that receipts from income-producing property awarded to her, even with no earnings 
imputed to her from employment, were sufficient to meet her needs. 
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Wife, not satisfied with these windfalls, would now have this Court compound 
the error below by awarding to her significant property found by the District Court 
to be the separate property of Husband. In seeking this further advantage, the Brief 
of Appellant misrepresents the Record, omits to marshal the facts supporting the 
challenged findings, resorts to exquisite technicalities, eschews the applicable law set 
forth by the appellate courts of Utah (citing instead cases from other jurisdictions 
clearly distinguishable on their facts), and ignores the clear weight of the evidence. 
General Principles for Awarding Property and Alimony in Divorce. It is 
perhaps well, before proceeding to the issue-specific arguments which follow, to 
restate briefly the general principles laid down by the appellate courts of Utah for 
resolving issues of property and alimony in divorce cases. Often, the cases take the 
form of commentary on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1 )3, which provides that "[w]hen 
a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties " Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(1) (1999). This statutory language confers "broad discretion upon trial courts in 
the division of property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition" to be 
exercised in a manner which "best serves the needs of the parties and best permits 
them to pursue their separate lives." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 
1987) (citations omitted). 
3(various revisions, the most current being that of 1999) 
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In its instructions to the trial court on remand, this Court in Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), prescribed a "systematic approach" for 
exercising its discretion in awarding property and fixing alimony in divorce cases: 
[T]he court should first properly categorize the parties" property as part of the 
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. Each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent 
of the marital property. But rather than simply enter such a decree, the court 
should then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be 
shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of those 
circumstances and in conformity with our decision. That having been done, 
the final step is to consider whether, following appropriate division of the 
property, one party or the other is entitled to alimony. 
Id , n.10; accord, Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Once the trial court has rendered its decision on the factual issues relating to 
property division and alimony, an appellate court will uphold that division "unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Bradfordv. DeMita, 1999UT App.373,f 12, 
384 Utah Adv. 26; cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ^ 12, 987 P.2d 603. 
(trial court's discretion must be exercised within "appropriate" legal standards). 
Moreover, the trial court abuses its discretion unless it enters specific and detailed 
findings in support of its decision, which must be "sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted) (quotation marks in original). 
An appellate court "is not entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court except in the extraordinary circumstance of a 'manifest injustice.'" Reese v. 
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Reese, 1999 UT 75, % 10, 984 P.2d 987 (citations omitted) (quotation marks in 
original). In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact, appellate courts 
give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses and do not set aside a challenged finding unless it is clearly erroneous. See 
Schaumbergv. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct App. 1994); Yelderman v. 
Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (holding the weight and credibility of 
testimony and other evidence is a matter for the trier of fact). 
This Court has stated the obligations of a party seeking review of a trial court's 
findings of fact as follows: 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, [a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. . . . M[T]he 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. 
Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, on rehrg. opinion replaced by, 989 P.2d 61, 366 
Utah Adv. 9, 379 Utah Adv. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted) (quotation 
marks in original); Schaumberg, 87 P.2d at 603 (denying husband's appeal of 
determination that business building was marital property where husband found not 
to have marshaled evidence supporting challenged finding that marital funds were 
used to maintain and improve the building). 
Virtually every one of the foregoing principles is violated by Appellant in her 
Brief. 
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CROSS APPEAL POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
WIFE A DISPROPORTIONATE TWO-THIRDS 
SHARE OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
In its disproportionate award of marital property, the District Court disregarded 
the orderly procedure mandated by this Court in Burt, which requires that property 
be first classified as separate property or marital property and which then presumes 
that the parties will be awarded the entirety of their separate property and one-half of 
the marital property absent some showing of "exceptional circumstances". The 
District Court made no finding of such exceptional circumstances, nor did it 
otherwise identify equitable considerations adequate to support its lopsided 
distribution of the marital property with its punitive impact on Husband. 
Findings by the District Court. In its Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the District Court, after excluding Husband's partnership 
interests in the ranching business and those shares of Zions Bank stock which it found 
to be separate property of the Husband, determined that approximately $3 million in 
asset value was appropriately classified as marital property. Of this amount, the 
Court awarded $2 million in value to Wife and $1 million in value to Husband. See 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 36, R. 236. The assets 
which the Court determined to be marital property consisted principally of the 
Monica Cove residence, Zions Bank shares acquired during the marriage with marital 
funds, automobiles, various retirement and pension accounts and miscellaneous 
personal property. The Court's distribution of these assets was essentially equal with 
the exception of the Monica Cove residence, which the Court awarded wholly to 
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wife, and the associated mortgage obligations, which the Court assigned solely to 
Husband. See Memorandum Decision. 17-19. R. 212-214.4 
The Court found, without further explanation or specific supporting findings, 
that "it is fair, just and equitable for [Husband] to hold [Wife] harmless from" the 
mortgage obligations on the Monica Cove residence. In a separate finding, the Court 
then awarded the residence itself to Wife with no other finding or reason than the 
conclusory statement, "pursuant to its general equitable powers . . . certain assets 
should not be divided equally between the parties even though they [are marital 
property]," coupled with the observation that "the Court recognizes that in so doing 
[Husband] had the benefit of premarital assets that are now of significant value." 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, |^ 36, R. 236. This finding 
may in turn relate, though the connection is never made explicit, to the Court's earlier 
finding that Husband "took weekend time away from the family to work on the 
[ranch] properties" and that the allocation to Wife of "commingled" property (the 
Monica Cove residence was acquired with the proceeds of sale of a pre-marital 
business interest of Husband and was the only asset explicitly identified by the Court 
as commingled) was therefore "equitable." Id. at fflf 14, 16, R. 227-228. 
Marshaled Facts Supporting Findings. The totality of the marshaled evidence 
which might support the disproportionate distribution of marital property therefore 
comes down to this: 
4Had the Court equally divided the equity in the Monica Cove residence, the 
overall division of marital property would then have been approximately equal. 
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(i) Husband's weekend work on the ranch took time away from his 
family, and 
(ii) Wife did not receive any interest in the ranch, which the Court 
found to be Husband's separate property. 
These two facts at most, and these alone, constitute the predicate for the feeble 
conclusory finding that it was therefore equitable to compensate Wife by giving her 
two-thirds of the $3 million marital property. 
Argument. Utah law rebuttably presumes that marital property will be divided 
equally. "Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); accord, Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (explaining once a court makes a finding that a specific item is marital 
property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless 
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise). In the 
exercise of its "broad equitable powers," however, "[a] trial court may elect to 
distribute marital property unequally when the circumstances and needs of the parties 
dictate a departure from the general rule " Bradford v. DeMita, 1999 UT App 373 
f 12, 384 Utah Adv. 26 (citations omitted). 
In Thomas, 1999 UT App., ffl| 23, 24 "[exceptional circumstances, 
memorialized in commendably detailed findings, justified departure from the general 
rule that each party is entitled to fifty percent of the marital property" where the trial 
court found that sale of a marital home would have forced husband to move from the 
area and lose his employment. See Thomas, %% 23 and 24. In contrast, no such 
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exceptional circumstances were found in two cases where the relevant facts are much 
closer to those involved here. In Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 849 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), no exceptional circumstances existed where both spouses had the ability 
to support themselves; and the trial court's award of the predominant share of liquid 
assets to Husband to permit him to discharge a debt was held to be error in the 
absence of findings sufficient to establish a valid marital debt. And in Hall, this 
Court found error in the trial court's unequal distribution of equity in the marital 
home in the absence of any finding that the basis for the inequality was wife's lack 
of work experience and need to care for two autistic children. 'The trial court made 
no findings as to any exceptional circumstances which took this case out of the 
presumptive rule of Burt" Hall, 858 P.2d at 1023. So it is here. 
In this case, the District Court's conclusory finding that "pursuant to its general 
equitable powers . . . certain assets should not be divided equally," even if tenuously 
coupled with the award of the ranch properties to Husband and the finding that 
Husband's work on the ranch required "weekend time away from the family", is 
similarly inadequate to show exceptional "circumstances and needs" of Wife which 
would "dictate a departure from the general rule" of equal distribution of marital 
property. See Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 % 26, 384 Utah Adv. 26. It is unclear, and 
the District Court made no attempt to explain, why Husband's weekend work on the 
ranch could have created some persisting and current exceptional circumstance or 
need of Wife which could be compensated for with an interest in the ranch properties. 
What the Court did here is clearly violative of the foundational principle, 
embodied in a long line of cases stretching from Burt and Hall to Bradford, that 
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identification and award of the parties' separate properties must be independent of, 
and must precede, the division of marital property. This Court cannot allow a trial 
court to disregard that principle, in the absence of explicit findings of extraordinary 
circumstance and need, without introducing ongoing doubt and uncertainty into our 
jurisprudence. To do so would severely limit the ability of the bar to provide reliable 
advice to clients contemplating divorce. And it would invite a flood of future appeals 
based upon little more than the desire of a marginally disappointed spouse to obtain 
at the hands of this Court the advantage he or she was denied at trial. 
For the Court to justify the disproportionate division of the Jensen's marital 
estate on the ground that it had already awarded to Husband separate property, to 
which he was clearly entitled as a matter of law and that is "now of significant value" 
is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion and should be reversed. See 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 36, R. 236 
CROSS-APPEAL POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING WIFE 
ALIMONY OF $4,000 PER MONTH. 
Findings by the District Court. After concluding that Wife might expect to 
realize as much as $100,000 annually, or $8,300 per month, from income-producing 
property awarded to her, the District Court inexplicably then proceeded to award her 
alimony of $4,000 per month. The Court did so without entering any findings as to 
the ongoing needs of either Wife or Husband. Moreover, as to Husband's ability to 
pay, the Court found only that Husband had been paying $6,000 per month of 
temporary alimony, that Wife had been paying from that amount the mortgage 
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obligations on the Monica Cove residence totaling approximately $2,200, that 
Husband would now make the mortgage payments, and that Husband had "gross 
income" of $190,000 per year or $16,250 per month. From these limited and 
incomplete findings the Court concluded that Husband could pay alimony of $4,000 
per month and that it was "fair, just and equitable" that he do so. See Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, fflj 36, 37, R. 236-237. 
Marshalled Evidence in Support of Finding. The evidence which may be 
marshaled in support of this conclusory finding consists of the following: 
(i) Although the Court made no determination in this regard, and 
although Husband's counsel developed evidence suggesting 
artificial inflation of the claimed expenses, the maximum amount 
of monthly expense which Wife claimed to anticipate following 
the divorce was $7,652 per month.5 See Plaintiffs Post-Trial 
Brief, 17, R. 124. 
(ii) Although there was some disagreement as to Husband's 
disposable annual income, the Court could have concluded from 
a schedule created by Wife's expert, Dean Smith, that Husband's 
"after tax cash flow", based on 1995 income and expense as 
shown in the parties' tax return, was $181,525 for that year, or 
$15,127 per month. The Court's actual finding of $190,000 may 
have been based on Husband's $191,898 of "adjusted gross 
5It is unclear whether this amount includes income taxes payable by Wife; Exhibit 
C to the Post-trial Brief, containing the detail, is missing from the Record. 
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income" taken from the same schedule. R. 324:53-56; Exhibit 
P-5. 
(iii) Husband's expenses, net of alimony and child support, were 
shown at trial to be $10,852 per month. R. 324:239-249, 
R. 325:91-92; Exhibit D-9. 
(iv) During the pendency of the divorce proceeding, Husband 
voluntarily paid Wife temporary alimony of $6,000 per month, 
from which Wife paid the mortgage obligations on the Monica 
Cove and Spring Glen residences. The Spring Glen residence 
was sold by Husband and Wife during the pendency of the 
divorce proceedings, thereby relieving Wife from the $700 per 
month payment required thereon, 
(v) The District Court stated as its reason for awarding alimony to Wife 
that "[Wife] should not be required to live off of the yield from her 
assets when the [Husband] would not be required to do so by reason of 
his separate earned income." Id. at J^ 37, R. 237. 
From these marshaled facts, and without taking into account either the wife's 
earning capacity or amounts received from income-producing properties awarded to 
her, it was possible for the Court to conclude that Husband had net income of $ 15,127 
per month which was sufficient to pay both his expenses of $10,852 and alimony to 
wife of $4,000 with a $275 margin to spare. The Court, however, entered no finding 
to that effect. 
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Argument. Husband recognizes and accepts the general principle, articulated 
by this Court in Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that 
Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards. Therefore, we 
will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court 
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards and 'supported 
its decision with adequate findings and conclusions . . ..' 
Id. at 946. (citations omitted) (quotations marks in original). In this case, however, 
the trial court neither applied "appropriate legal standards" nor did it support its 
decision with the required findings. 
The legal standards applicable to alimony begin with the principle that "[t]he 
general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public 
charge and to maintain to the extent possible the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citations omitted). Alimony is thus remedial, rather than punitive, in character. 
This, in turn, requires that the trial court make specific findings as to "(1) the 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to support him or herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support." Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations 
omitted) (matter quoted in original). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where the income from the assets 
awarded to the plaintiff is sufficient to maintain her in the manner to which she is 
accustomed without periodic payments from the defendant," an award of substantial 
alimony is error. See Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380,1381 (Utah 1973). Similarly, 
alimony was held not to be an appropriate means of adjusting a disparity between the 
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income of the parties where the wife to whom it was awarded had "substantial 
accumulated wealth and monthly income" which permitted her "a standard of living 
comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The facts developed in the Record of this matter fall into a similar pattern. The 
Court found, and wife does not appear to dispute, that her receipts from the income-
producing property awarded to her are sufficient without more to meet her needs. 
She did not claim, and the Court made no finding, that such an amount would be 
insufficient to maintain the standard of living to which she was accustomed. The 
Court did not even consider her personal earning capacity, although the evidence was 
that she had developed a useful level of office skills and was a "very good employee." 
R. 324:195-197. 
On these facts, it was supererogatory and a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion for the Court to award her alimony in any amount, certainly at the level of 
$4,000 per month, a punitive imposition on Husband without any demonstration of 
offsetting need on the part of Wife. The Court's stated reason for so doing, that 
"[Wife] should not be required to live off of the yield from her assets when the 
[Husband] would not be required to do so by reason of his separate earned income," 
is without foundation in relevant Utah case law and is at odds with the concept of 
alimony as a remedial rather than a punitive device. 
Moreover, even if the Record evidence were sufficient to support an award of 
alimony in some amount to wife, the District Court failed to enter findings sufficient 
to enable this Court to evaluate the appropriateness of the award. In determining 
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alimony, Utah trial courts are required to consider and make specific findings 
regarding the needs of both spouses and the ability of the paying spouse. See 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 880. Of the three matters so required to be considered, the 
District Court entered findings of any degree only with respect to the third, the ability 
of the payor spouse to make the required payment, and that, mistakenly, a finding of 
gross income rather than disposable net. 
The award of alimony to wife was, therefore, clear and prejudicial error and 
cannot stand. 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT I. 
WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE ZIONS 
BANK SHARES AWARDED TO HUSBAND AS HIS SEPARATE 
PROPERTY. 
Separate Property. The principles are well known which govern property 
brought into a marriage by gift to, or inheritance by, one of the parties. "As a general 
rule, equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into 
the marriage." Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Stating the matter more fully, the Utah Supreme Court has said, 
[TJrial courts making 'equitable' property division pursuant to section 
30-3-5 should... generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 
that spouse, together with any appreciation in its value, unless (1) the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of 
an interest therein to the other spouse. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). In 
accordance with these principles, the District Court determined that the 2,126 shares 
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of Zions Bank stock which husband had brought with him into the marriage, and 
which had thereafter, by virtue of stock splits and dividend re-investments, less sales, 
grown to 58,352 shares, were the separate property of Husband. 
Wife does not dispute that, on these facts alone, the 58,352 shares were 
Husband's separate property. She contends, however, that Husband's subsequent 
placing of the shares in joint tenancy at her request had the effect of conveying to her 
a present interest, thereby rendering the shares marital property. 
In support of this contention, the Brief of Appellant somewhat confusingly 
argues that the creation of the joint tenancy operated to confer upon Wife a present 
interest as a matter of law, subject to a "correctness11 standard of review, but then 
proceeds to argue the factual issue of the parties' intent in creating the joint tenancy. 
Without marshaling the evidence in favor of the trial court's finding that the shares 
remained the separate property of Husband notwithstanding the conveyance into joint 
tenancy, her brief then further confounds the analysis by failing to make critical 
distinctions between cases where the joint tenancy is at issue as between the joint 
tenants and those cases where the action is brought by a third party. A final source 
of confusion is the use of precedent from other jurisdictions which has been 
specifically rejected in Utah and citation of Utah cases for their dicta "sound-bites" 
rather than for their holdings. 
Facts. Before examining the case law, it is important to be clear as to the 
Record facts, including the testimony of Wife which parallels that of Husband as to 
the purpose of placing the shares in joint tenancy. In support of her claim that 
Husband placed the 58,352 shares in joint tenancy with the intent of conveying a 
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present interest, her brief emphasizes Wife's testimony that she asked Husband to 
place the shares in joint tenancy because, "I just feel like isn't that what this marriage 
is all about. We're both working in the same direction for the same ends." See Brief 
of Appellant, p. 5, (citing R. 323:64). But the brief fails to quote her further testi-
mony that she raised the issue with Husband because of her concerns about the fate 
of the shares in the event of his untimely death. "At that particular time I felt like it 
was very important, because he was gone a lot. And I said to Jim, 6[i]f something 
ever happened to you, you know I - I wouldn't want to have to deal with it.'n 
R. 323:128. 
When that testimony is included, the testimony of both parlies as to the limited 
purpose for which Husband placed the shares in joint tenancy is entirely consistent. 
It was Husband's corroborating testimony that "[s]he indicated to me that the stock 
was all in my name, and she was concerned if something happened to me, and that 
I was traveling, and away from home a lot, what would happen. To my stock." 
R. 324:214-216. The assertion in the Brief of Appellant that "Husband's only 
evidence that no present interest was intended was his own self-serving statement 
made years after the fact" is thus plainly false. 
The Brief of Appellant not only omits to note the simple and compelling 
consistency of the testimony of the two parties, but further obscures the facts by 
imputing to Husband a desire to conceal from Wife his "secret" intention to convey 
less than a present interest in the shares, a motive for which there is not a scrap of 
evidence in the Record, and for which her brief cites none, and by indulging in an 
irrelevant disquisition on the fiduciary duties owed between spouses. See Pierce v. 
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Pierce, 386 Utah Adv. Rep ]K ^ | 1 - ._. One might as well conclude that, since 
\\ ili oinniuincaied to Husband no other reason for requesting that he place the 
^IUK- "•" ;<Mnt tenancy than feai of his untimely deati^ """• -onceaW * r 
secret intention to acquire a present interest in the shares in breacn or ner nuia :ary 
I i j , i , : . . . , i 
5
.... i i»nc of this artful dodging matters, because Husband gave Wife precisely 
- * ^ • • ; v . . s
 t * U ' \ i d i n g 
i roiection against the possibility of Husband's untimeh
 M^ih. That was her HVJ 
i ony enciteaoynei , .. .uiulvcoun^ *> tewasuriaoie 
to identify am other coherent rea^v u-er *--!- .t than the • * * 
; ai v-.;,^ mis mama*^ . -
 4ih auuui \\ c »c tu^h working in me sairn aired-*-'. 
;
 • die bame ends." R *2"-bn. i iauuu ' I t 
its larger context. Knc\eu 'hat Wife aeuiaiiy meant to sa\ something like "I wanted 
a present in '" 
1lad there been un\ evidence tha= -ne sought a present interest in the shares oi ::u; 
; ^ w j e ( j g e t 0 p r e v e n t t ^ q t 
result, the Court could have found that as well, but <*...-• \nd the Court <iai nui 
u
 *«"r' ' |L-" ' i ili ill I in mi 1,1 j lirlcmi; ill il ^uppu ; ^ ;i . . , , .><?e extravagant 
p opositiom \ . ' the Brief o? \ppellant asserts them as fact and from them tl n 
. , ' ..: ^ anient. 
ihe [district Court, having heard the testimou* 
inconvemc;. facts not marshaled by Wife in her hneh and haMUL -w ^; .., i\ 
ci edibiiii; I he witnesses, fonn.< 
This change [the placing of the shares in joint tenancy] was made according 
to the testimony of the parties at a time when the Defendant was engaged in 
significant business travel, and the change was made to avoid probate in the 
event of his untimely death. There was no evidence adduced at the trial of any 
donative intent with respect to such exchange. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law f^ 18, R. 230-231. That 
finding is entitled to the deference owed by an appellate court to the trial court that 
heard the witnesses, whose determination it will not set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983). 
The Brief of Appellant relies in part upon California and Arizona case law to 
the effect that creation of joint tenancy confers a present interest as a matter of law 
and that the intention of the parties is irrelevant. But those cases all derive from the 
same California jurisprudence, a community property state, in particular the 
California case of Kennedy v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 P. 647 (Cal. 1915), and 
its subsequent statutory incarnation, which was expressly rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Neill v. Royce, 120 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1941). Those foreign 
cases may therefore be ignored. 
More interesting are the Utah cases cited in the Brief of Appellant, though less 
for the general and commonly accepted principle espoused, that joint tenancy creates 
a rebuttable presumption of a present interest, than for what their facts tell us about 
how that presumption may be overcome in the view of the Utah courts. 
The earliest of these cases of interest, Neill v. Royce, the case which first 
adumbrates the subsequently articulated Utah rule that creation of a joint tenancy 
creates a rebuttable presumption, is inapposite on its facts: the challenge to the joint 
tenancy was brought by an intervenor not a part}7 to the joint tenancy, after the death 
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o r one of the joint tenants; and :K opinion reflects and rests upon the solicitude of 
NeilL J) P -\: at 32X-21* ^es not s n c ^ LV_ ihi nurde . ; :w4»of as betweep ! -
:• sol -•• . i led in error ; . '-M ,u ,.i.ii n, uie context of this 
case for the proposition that "the parties' [i.e., the joint tenants' own] statements of 
their intention were insufficient u> sati>iv the requirement of clear and convincing 
proof." 
The Rnc! ui \ppellant completely misreads the ea^e of Greener v. Greener, 
I'M i il l lml r i 
lound, notwithstanding diametrically opposing testimony from the ioini tenants as to 
, . • . . *^.*: i;i<* ing joint 
tewawto, the presumption could be overcome e\ en b\ enr.nn^mtial evidence that the 
Villi" did mil inli'iiil In i onvn n prose nt interest to the husband when MK- I icaeu i-er 
pre-existing separate funds ^ * •• ' -.••npn^ Op *h:?? »M*is. 'he (/>,,-;. 
.il In mod a tindiiiy b\ the trim uiuh usui ^ theprec^e equi\ alentofthe finding 01 me 
District Court in this case. See Greener 
the decision here is, ii ideed. ~~* circun .1- ' ireenew but much nu ^ 
compelling, consisting nf piii.illt'l ,111 1 11 1 ipm< ,il!\ uinhiii i i l iw' leslimnn1, nl I n 1 il II 1 
parties as to the purpose of the joint tenancy. 
i.. - - . J v 
distinguishable on their facts. In re Estate ofAshton, 898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. App. 
ICI •' is ' le joint tenants,;-,u between one of them and fUr 
heirb of the other, and worn ji'f on considerations of the pr<^pp> ui a imo J 
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on the deceased grantor's intent as expressed in his will rather than his intent at the 
time of creating the joint tenancy. See id. at 826. Ashton does not, and could not, 
address the sufficiency of evidence to overcome the burden of joint tenancy as 
between the joint tenants themselves. See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Kimball, 
442 P.2d 472 (Utah 1968), also involved a claim asserted by a third party where one 
of the joint tenants was dead, as did McCullough v. Wasserback, 518 P.2d 691 (Utah 
1974). 
Moreover, Appellant fails in her duty to apprise this Court of a more recent 
case which significantly weakens the argument in favor of Wife, Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). In that case the husband disputed the award 
to wife of some $ 19,000 which represented the value of a mobile home which she had 
brought into the marriage and subsequently placed in joint tenancy. In doing so, the 
Court commented that, "[although the home was held in joint tenancy, that is not 
conclusive that a gift has been made" and affirmed the trial court's finding that "there 
was no intention by Plaintiff to create a one-half property interest in Defendant." Id. 
at 328. 
In short, the Brief of Appellant cites no Utah case which on its facts supports 
the arguments advanced. And it misreads one of the two Utah cases which support 
the finding of the District Court, Greener, and ignores the other, Jesperson. 
Appellant's law on this issue is no better than Appellant's facts. The finding of the 
District Court is supported by competent evidence in the Record, conforms to the 
requirements of Utah law, and should be affirmed. 
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REPI ,Y TO APPELLANT'S POINT II. 
W I F E I S N O T E N T I T L E I ) T ( ) O N E . H A L i , u t H L SB AINU'S 
INTEREST IN THE RANCHING BUSINESS, AWARDED TO 
HUSBAND AS HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
\n.er an exhaustive i ev iew of largely unconti o\ er ted t ;d " !c ? ,: "  i ll" " ,1 1:1: lat 
1 lusband had received essentially all of his interest in the Jensc1 * "iiily ranching 
business by gift or inheritance from hi^  parents, and consistent with UK IUIO aid 
Husband,, finding v\\\ "*t - *..»• ust and equitable ma: ^ ><cn properties ne u\,v* > 
In separate piupt:ilkM< fit :)it i i tl le III.III ill.ill < 'il.ih1, i n r l i K l i n g am . t j p p i v n u l n l • a h ic 
therein." Suppl e 11 act and Conclusions of Law * •* R 227. Wile 
. . , - riusoar, .\e . . 1 
properties "*• nJed ill tiiw - n r . - p uuiipio tL\tin wiilpn the **amework 
picsi/ifoed ..- Jortensen, tiun iiu.M^,id , interest in the rancl ling business had 
become comivr'v^d with marital property and that she had expended efforts in 
connection v^:*t me business which umic ;r~~ he*-an interest cognizable in equity. 
perties? Was marital r * i t ny commi _ A nunc : inching business or \^ t 
i .< >1 ? 
Failure to Marshal Facts. Wife's argument thus goes to the sufficient of the 
_; neiLne courts of Utah, she is therefore requned to marshal the evidence in support 
oi die nndings and then to show, notwithstanding uii evidence, that the findings are 
against the clear weight of the evident - *• * \ 
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fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings [she] resists.'1 Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App. 278, f36. This she 
has completely failed to do. 
Wife makes a series of incomplete factual assertions in support of her claim to 
an interest in the ranching business. For a full statement of the material facts relating 
to these claims, however, see 'Tacts Relating to Award of Separate Property to 
Husband," supra, pp. 2-10. A full review of those facts demonstrates the following: 
Wife made no material contribution of time or effort to the ranching business. 
There is no evidence to support the claim at page 9 of the Brief of Appellant that Wife 
"often" accompanied Husband to the ranch or that she performed "maintenance 
duties" while there. Her visits were as few as ten in number over a period of 27 years 
and her only work identified in the Record was cooking meals for guests on what 
appear to have been primarily social, rather than working, visits. Such is the entirety 
of the evidence to support her claim of having devoted significant time and effort to 
the ranching business. 
Thus, by no stretch either of the imagination or of equitable indulgence can 
Wife's claimed efforts on behalf of the ranching business be deemed sufficient to 
meet her burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the District 
Court erred in finding that she "went very infrequently to the [ranch] properties and 
there was no evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the properties." 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 14, R. 227. 
Neither the $85,000 T-N Company note to Malpaso nor three $10,000 notes 
gifted to Wife by Husband's father involved any commingling of marital property in 
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the ranching business. Wife' would have this Coin I: belie\ e that Malpaso 
i niporiilior "" * n , , , t i "• ,IIIIJJ ," ,|A • l i L ,i1"1 • i n l i nil1 i I ini i ii11 l i i d i i i i l t K ; i I M M F <il 
marital funds u> 1 • \ <Vmpanv the operating entity of the Jensen family ranching 
Ibi isil less, •-. . . . . . . . . . . . w.;h* ..:>irate -nai . an actual 
transfer of marital funds was made from Malpaso i<* I'-N r ^ p a n y and that eithei {nj 
.. \\x:,o use,f was m..;. ..: property or (1 > v * -t ^ Malpaso ^ ^ V 
Lomp'^v Here marital tunu^. 
w 11 c demonstrates none of th< >se Ihree propositions w ith credible e\ idence 
aciuai lund transler in me amount of $8 1 »N ('ompany is the testimony lo ihc 
r
" ere ever was a cash 
u jii^acuon.- K ^24:91-92 Wile's States «>f*-act leaps i * argumentative 
Ipasowa;, ^uiiiivuu jii.j \aj>"lonnatrea^wi 
i:iv a iviu'"1 *. i ^ ^ -v.--* w.4... j] tfie stock was r v — * 
At
^rellant ~ \LIUM MIL- UICN no !a-v 'n support of that sell-proclaimed pnnv..ra 
^ iiil fdi \\\\ inil i^nf.i'i'^ i« i tiifUi . 11,11 HIHH, , \\ |(i-1 .!.- .i n il|tli marital kinds or 
property were ever pro\ uled n * \].\ raso, either as pari of the initial capitalization of 
The clain { ^ ife that "funds Malpaso and A -^ % * ^ r-N Company were 
ii1 i^ l ti i piiR'bii liiiii'Ty linn I I I ('ompany ^ , ^ L mdcninery was then used 
as collateral ^ .;,~ voinpanv to secure financing iui additional Hvirnlli and 
development" appears u> nave been confected —* ~f whole cloth, no such evidence 
appearing in the Record. The %id of Apirllanl in MipfM.ri 
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of this claim refers not to the evidentiary Record at all but to a page in Wife's Post-
Trial Brief. The page cited is undocumented and does not, in any case, support the 
contention made in the Brief of Appellant for which it is cited. See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 10, R. 118. 
She also claims, long after the fact, that three $ 10,000 notes of T-N Company 
payable to Husband's father, T.N. Jensen, gifted by him to Wife, and (like the 
Malpaso note) subsequently canceled without any actual cash transaction, somehow 
required that the District Court award her an interest in the ranching business. 
Clearly, if the three notes had any real value at all (as distinguished from their value 
to T.N. Jensen as a means of tax avoidance), they were Wife's separate property. The 
appropriate time for her to assert her claim, if any, was when the notes were not paid 
according to their terms but canceled and credited to the Jensen brothers equity 
accounts. If she can find a way around the statute of limitations (the notes were 
canceled in 1993), she can still bring that claim against T-N Company in a legal 
proceeding to which it is a party. But she cannot claim that the cancellation of the 
notes by T-N Company represented a commingling of marital property, because the 
notes were hers and hers alone. 
Thus, upon scrutiny, these note transactions reveal themselves as something 
other than the characterization urged in the Brief of Appellant. Whatever the reality 
of these transactions, there is no evidence of commingling of marital property with 
the ranching business; and the fragmentary facts adduced by Wife for that purpose 
fail the test of clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the District 
Court's finding that "T.N. Company is comprised of inherited property and should 
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remain the sole and separate property of the Defendant including any appreciated 
" 1111,ie 111< ? r e i > r i . 1 Supplemental I mum 
223, . 
/ tie do~\ uuu i-uninouida ox n us band to i -A L ompany represented proceeds 
of the sale of Zions Rank shares which were the separate property of Husband. We 
have already seen trial 1 iu>haiid held a large block of Zions Bank shares which he 
originally received by gift from his parc-t • - . -.- ^ fliaiTS r n r l : - ^ i i 
hanUN at ine + ;ne o\ ire divorce. Husband ai.»: ^ <e .ic.mred with mania! \iu\i^ 
additi* ' f 
claim that a sale ol 861 shares and tl le contribution of the $65.*>0(- nnxeeds o? ,,:ie 
i * iglingoi • propert) ,.., ..;u :^-..,i^s 
thus requires her to show that the 861 ^hnres came frnm the shares VWK 
. . . : . . , . ^. ,.* , lone so ImJu il„ it is apparent thai ^he 
;ru oi do so ^ince the entire 30,M] shares acv ared with marital fund- - •• • 
the time of the divorce and were ui v iueo cqua u~**.vecn the parties by the District 
Coui t. 
There is, in fact, no evidence to si ipport Wife's claim that $65,000 of marital 
convincing evidence sufficient to cast in doubt the District Court,"s finding that his 
iiileivsl in T M I "onipanv i . (lie *0|p,n.ilr pinpoih nl I In In inul. 
Fractional partnership interests in T-N Ranches given bv Husband to his 
siblings wef 'e his sepat ate pi opert v. in which Wife held no interest, I he evidence is 
unequivocal that Husband received his partnership interest in T-N Ranches as a 
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cauuon, pernaps in an excess ot husbandly sentimentality — the Record is silent as 
to his motive) added a signature line for his Wife on the declarations of gift by which 
he transferred minor fractions of that interest to his siblings for the purpose of 
equalizing those interests at the request of his father. The claim that to do so 
somehow gave Wife an interest in the partnership is contrary to the very purpose of 
the transaction. 
Wife does not claim, as she does with respect to the Zions Bank stock, that 
Husband ever gifted to her any interest in T-N Ranches. Had he intended to do so, 
he undoubtedly would have used the same form of writing he used to convey such 
interests to his siblings. Her evidence in this regard again falls far short of that 
quantum of clear and convincing evidence requisite for this Court to set aside the 
District Court's finding that "it is fair, just and equitable that [T-N Ranches and other] 
such properties be found to be separate properties from the marital estate, including 
any appreciated value therein." Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 114. R, 227, 
No marital property or funds were used by Husband to acquire Moynier Ranch 
assets. Wife's final claim to an interest in the ranching business rests upon a fanciful 
mixture of unrelated evidence and pure invention to suggest that somehow $25,000 
of marital funds were used in the purchase of the Moynier Ranch properties from the 
Moynier family. She asserts, without qualification, "The $25,000 down payment 
came from the parties' marital funds." Brief of Appellant, p. 12. The claim is utterly 
without support in the Record. The first of the two citations given in support of the 
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v; him is not to am evidentiary matter but to Husband's Post-Trial Brief, \\ K u -^ates 
cs:^  thai 2>25,000 can be traced to marital funds." R. 82 ? fixing in turn 
Exh ib i t sD-27 , DOS\ I V 1 ^ M - (< " l"l- "h ^ Hi m V.^ i i n" i I i II n > "lung 
is less than som.et.hing, no evidence, including the cited exhibits , traces any amount 
iisrcl in III.1 MiiMiin puu lus r In 111,11 iliil hinds I i lie s e u m d uLil inn ick ' i s In '"| I,.' b 
.-t ihe Court N Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclus ions of Law, which 
; jherc was no evidence of cash calls from marital estate property from any • 
o( the brothers, except for one sum of approximately $25,000 w hich 
apparently was received in cash at the time of the passing of TN Jensen. 
[I]t is unclear as to whether the $25,000 is separate from the testimony in 
which it was testified that the Defendant put approximately $25,000 into the 
purchase price of the Moynier Ranch, arguably from marital property 
R. 223-224. The District (Vr-
fact r~ e^ idence in the kecoru v ^ i m o n i a l or d o c u m e n t a r y o* a S2^ :*0(
 %u A \ 
paym v ' J i HHII I nlvin i iiiiiii Il unig .in iiiiiinKiiii uf 
$25,000 v- i * . iin] - t e s innom slut he received a distribution in that amount from 
1
 - JV- " - documentary evidence linking 
that distribution to any of the funds used to purchase Moynier; and. had there been, 
ill i iiiil'iill nol lluiVL11 changed the result since any such funds received by inheritance 
were Husband's separate nronenv. 
Once again, the evidence adduced by Wife falls short, of the "clear a.i id 
convincing" standard and is woefully insufficient l< w .n r.uil this ( i in fs sc ttii ig aside 
iiic hnding of the Distiici i oun v,\n\ Husband's interests in, Moynier and the other 
•*•
 j
" * ' icss 11 I I Il I In'in mi i id J sput lib I)' received by 
inheritance or gift from, his parents , were his separate properly 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court, in dealing with a large and complex aggregate of properties 
and associated transactions, made only two significant mistakes. The mistakes were 
not, however, those Appellant urges on this Court. Certainly, there is more than 
sufficient evidence to sustain the District Court's finding that the transfer into joint 
tenancy of the Zions Bank shares did not operate to convey a present interest to Wife. 
That was not what she asked for, and that was not what she got. There was clear and 
convincing testimony from both parties from which the Court could conclude that the 
purpose of the transaction was to provide for her orderly succession to the shares in 
the event of Husband's death, not before. 
Nor are the bits and pieces Wife tries to pull together to support her claim to 
an interest in the Jensen family ranching properties, some of them apparently 
concocted for the occasion, adequate to demonstrate a "clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion" in the award exclusively to Husband of his interest in those separate 
properties. Wife neither contributed significant effort to the ranching business, nor 
is there any credible evidence that marital property was commingled with that 
business. 
The mistakes which the District Court did make appear to reflect a desire to 
somehow compensate Wife for Husband's failure to devote two full days a week 
exclusively to his family. To a trial judge who has seen many a marriage that has 
disintegrated through inattention, that is understandable enough. But the good judge, 
however laudable his intentions, broke the rules. Under the binding standards laid 
down by this and the Utah Supreme Court for the exercise of his equitable discretion, 
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he could not award alimony in excess of W'i/fe's demonstrated needs, as to which he 
ack i.w'ijhv ; -. • ::*v ..* necessary f indings. Noi could 1 le distribute marital 
property disproportionately, contrary1 to the presumption of equal distribution, absent 
a finding of extraoi 'dinar)' circumstance and need, i ic found none, there was none. 
Aeeonliiieh Wife's fippenl must he denied ;md i lushnnd's tToss-.ippeiil iiiiiMl! 
be granted. 
• Di ite< I' .1 .i J j j / d a y of Febi i i; n i 2000. ": 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONSJfctfWENSON 
XARKW.'SESSIONS 
T. MICKELL JIMENEZ 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
/Cross-Appellant James T. Jensen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2^i- of February, 2000, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT was mailed 
via first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Rodney R. Parker 
Julianne P. Blanch 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
48 
